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to play a peaceful game of Acey-Deucy has 
vanished. A reduction of operation schedules 
by a flat 20% for all types of operations would 
go far towards easing the tension which con-
verts a professional man anxious to escape to 
his home, his basement hobbies, and when he 
can, to the civilian world. 
An excellent article some years ago in the 
PROCEEDINGS recommended that general 
avy Department paperwork be directed to 
type commanders for screening and imple-
mentation instead of being sent direct to 
individual commands. Type commanders 
can evaluate the over-all work load of their 
individual units ; the Navy Department can-
not. 
Certainly it is not the Navy's intention to 
disrupt family life unnecessarily. Yet, ab-
sences from home of six to nine months can-
not be considered normal in today's life. We 
have a married avy down to seaman ap-
prentice. Junior line officers face the first 
long sea tour of six years just at the wrong 
time for their families and see three more 
years of frequent separations just when they 
are at the point of decision of making the 
avy a career. And on ships finally back in 
home port, watches are generally stood one 
in three so that the point is constantly kept 
in mind. It would be a lot of trouble, but 
worthwhile, to rotate junior officers ashore 
for two years upon completion of their first 
three years at sea. 
Why not decrease the frequency of all in-
port watches to one in four? I cannot agree 
with Commander Crenshaw's recommenda-
tion that we re-establish permanent foreign 
fleets or squadrons since this would make the 
Navy dependent on a foreign base and de-
stroy that mobility which gives naval forces so 
much unique value today. Instead we should 
have a faster rotation. Could we not make 
tours with the Sixth and Seventh Fleets no 
more than four months in duration for 
large ships and three months for small 
ships? We have our choice : a fast rotation 
of ships or a fast rotation of personnel in the 
ships. 
The Navy is making much progress today 
in coming back towards the professional 
spirit which was once so much in evidence. 
An example of our own short-comings, such 
as Commander Crenshaw's article, is periodi-
cally necessary. There should be no such 
word as "can't" when we face the answers to 
the problem of the massive continuing per-
sonnel turnover. When ships can only fight 
when the first team has the watch, we are 
only 30% effective or less. 
If a captain of a ship decides that he is 
having fun, and if he is determined to han 
his people have fun , and if he actively seek 
ways to make his cruise and everything that 
the ship does, fun, then, he must and will 
make progress. 
LIEUTENANT WAYNE P. HUGHES, usx.-
J unior officers must have been pleased and a 
little surprised to read Commander Cren-
shaw's accurate exposition of their objec-
tions to a naval career. i\Iost of us junior 
officers wondered, I think, if senior officers, 
who never faced the decision for or against a 
career as it presents itself today, could under-
stand what the real roots of the problem 
were. Commander Crenshaw summarized 
the complaints- lack of prestige, the promo-
tion system, the administrative burden, and 
unstable operations- so eloquently that his 
article is sure to evoke many and lengthy 
comments. It is a minor triumph of self-
restraint for me to restrict myself to one 
short comment on one of his points. 
Of all the topics of conversation in junior 
officer gripe sessions, the favorite is the one 
they feel every day, the subject of too much 
correspondence, too many reports, and over-
administration. Some of them are real gripes, 
some are not, but every ensign could talk for 
thirty minutes extemporaneously on the sub-
ject and interject at least six concre te illus-
trations. So could every lieutenant, and I 
fancy, so could every captain. Instead of an 
illustration, let me emphasize the significance 
of its effect with an analogy: 
Every city has speed limits. They are 
usually rigidly enforced, but of course there 
are always a few gay blades who still exceed 
the limits. Yet, nobody contemplates putting 
governors on cars every time they enter the 
city to eliminate all speeding. If somebody 
bothered to analyze why, he'd probably giYe 
these reasons: First, it would take a great 
deal of time and money to rig and unrig the 
governors. Second, everybody being me-
chanically prevented from speeding, you'd 
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never find out who were the irresponsible 
drivers until they were not just arrested for 
speeding, but for killing or breaking the law 
m some other reckless fashion . Third, every-
one is being penalized fo r the actions of a 
guilty few . Fourth, in case speed is needed in 
an emergency, it would not be there. Fifth, 
people wouldn't live in the town. 
That's what administrative overcontrol 
does in the Navy: 
1. It takes valuable time and costs money. 
2. It prevents the Navy from un covering 
and weeding out the weak links- until 
a major disaster occurs. 
3. I t stifles the initiative of the energetic, 
the thinking, and especially the creative 
young brains in the Navy. It binds their 
minds in such a mass of details that 
they can't see through the white paper 
fog to the most important thing- im-
proving battle readiness. 
-1. If war comes, initiative is no longer there. 
The mind that has been drilled to think 
that a misplaced comma is a major sin 
is slow to risk a life, a ship, a battle. 
5 . Last, and the main point of course, 
bright young men don't stay in such an 
organization. 
~ o, I'm not advocating anarchy. My 
imaginary city isn't going to abolish speed 
law ; neither is it going to dissolve the police 
force. I am echoing the cry fo r fewer and 
shorter reports, fewer and shorter directives, 
\es repetition of directives and reports down 
the chain of command, and shorter adminis-
trative inspection check-off lists (bu t no t 
horter or less frequent inspections) . Let us 
concentrate on operational smartness that is 
demanding to the utmost, but in an ad-
ministrative atmosphere of such freedom as 
to permit growth of confidence that will only 
deyelop when there is the knowledge of con-
fidence "down" of which Commandor Cren-
sba w so wisely remarks. 
German Articles in the Proceedings 
(See page 509, May, 1956 PROCEEDINGS) 
RICHARD H ANSER.- ! began reading " Hit-
ler and the German Officer Corps" in your 
1Iay issue under the impression that the 
PROCEEDINGS was offering some historical 
in ight into a serious problem by a writer in 
a position to speak with authority. What I 
found instead was a wretched rehash of 
threadbare evasions and falsifications which 
would be contemptible in a German illus-
trated weekly, let alone under the imprint 
of the United States Naval Institute. 
1erely to outline Assmann's calculated 
omissions and deliberate distortions would 
take as much space as the article itself. T he 
very footnotes were marvels of obfuscation . 
What a windfall fo r a writer with "close per-
sonal contact with the Germans in high 
command" to find an outlet for his justifica-
tions of the Nazi High Command in such a 
journal as the PR0CEEDIKGS which bears the 
imprimatur of the United States Navy !* I t 
is a propagandist's dream. 
An officer of the Assmann stripe would 
naturally not understand an officer of the 
calibre of Henning von Tresckow, who is, of 
course, denigrated in the article. After the 
plot of July 20th had failed, Tresckow faced 
death with the words: "Now they will fall 
upon us and vilify us . . . . When I am shortly 
called on to give an account of myself before 
God I am confident that I can justify my 
action against Hitler with a clear conscience. 
... The moral worth of a man begins at the 
point where he is will ing to die for his con-
victions." 
Viewpoint on Logistics 
(See page 97, January, 1957 PROCEEDINGS) 
COMMODORE DUDLEY W. KNOX, US 
(RET.)-Professor Albion is quite wrong in 
asserting that the "oldtime naval line" of-
ficers regarded logistics as "something rather 
beneath them" and took it " for granted that 
the ·necessary materials would be on hand 
when needed, but were not particularly con-
cerned with how they got there." (" Biblio-
graphical Sur__vey of Logistics," J anuary, 
1957 PROCEEDINGS.) In fact, the truth is 
precisely opposite. ecessarily their cheer-
fully accepted duties were largely logistical 
and scrupulously performed. 
The assumption that the oldtime Pursers 
and Paymasters carried the main logistic 
* (EDITOR'S OTE: The U. S. Java! Institute is a 
private organization, and its publications do not bear 
the imprimatur of the U. S. avy.) 
